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This paper asks how takeover and failure hazards change 
as listed firms get older.  The hypothesis is that they 
increase because firms gradually run out of growth 
opportunities. We find the opposite.  Both takeover and 
failure hazard drop significantly with age.  The decline in 
takeover hazard can be explained with Loderer, Stulz, and 
Waelchli’s (2013) “buggy whip makers” hypothesis: 
Because old firms are comparatively well-managed and 
are affected by limited agency problems, on average, they 
offer little value added potential to acquirers.  Failure 
hazard drops because to learning.  The results are robust 
to various alternative interpretations and cannot be 
explained by unobserved heterogeneity.  While hazards 
decline with age, they do not go to zero.  This explains 
why, eventually, all listed firms disappear.   
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1. Introduction 
Recent studies show that listed firms run out of growth opportunities as they get older.  
According to Bernstein (2012) and Asker, Ljungqvist, and Farre-Mensa (2012), the decision 
to go public is associated with a significant drop in innovation and investment.  Moreover, 
after listing, managers appear to focus on assets in place rather than to search for new 
investment opportunities (Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli, 2013) (henceforth LSW).  One would 
therefore expect that, as they get older, firms are increasingly exposed to the threat of 
bankruptcy or takeover (Schumpeter, 1975; Jensen, 2000; Baker and Kennedy, 2002).  The 
purpose of this study is to investigate whether Schumpeter’s “perennial gale of creative 
destruction” sweeps more vigorously over older firms and confronts them with higher 
hazards of takeover and financial failure.   
Using a large sample of U.S. listed firms over the period 1978 to 2009, we show that 
this is not the case.  Both the hazards of financial failure and takeover (defined as merger or 
acquisition) actually decline significantly with age.  The effect is economically tangible.  
Compared with a 5-year-old firm, for example, the predicted age-induced reduction in exit 
hazard of a 25-year-old firm (sample median age) can be as much as 35 percent.  While 
average hazard rates decline over time, they do not drop to zero.  Our estimates imply, for 
example, that only approximately 30 percent of the firms that make it to age 20 will celebrate 
their 40th birthday as independent organizations.  This can explain why, eventually, all firms 
disappear as independent organizations. 
The decline in takeover hazard over time can be explained with the evidence in LSW:  
While firms gradually run out of growth opportunities as they get older, their strategic focus 
increases and their productivity improves.  Moreover, their profitability declines and reverts 
to average.  There is also little evidence of serious agency problems in older firms.  Because 
of these characteristics, there seems to be limited potential for value creation from a takeover 
of older firms at market prices.  Older firms are less interesting merger or acquisition 
partners. 
We show that the age effect in takeover hazard is indeed related to the large group of 
firms with the characteristics we just mentioned, namely firms older than the median in their 
industry, with growth opportunities below the industry median, and active in established 
markets and with established (more replicable) technologies—all characteristics that fit the 
stereotype of buggy-whip makers (BWM) mentioned in LSW.  When we control for this 
group of companies in our hazard model, the age effect on takeover risk disappears.  The 
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firms we identify as BWM are by no means minor.  Quite the contrary, they include some of 
the biggest names in corporate America.  In 2009, well-known companies to which this 
characterization applied included Alcoa, Burlington Northern Santa Fe, Coca Cola, Dow 
Chemical, GAP, General Dynamics, Hershey, McDonald’s, Nucor, Pepsi, Procter & Gamble, 
Walt Disney, and Xerox.     
The finding of a lower hazard of financial failure over time can be explained with 
learning.  Age enables firms to gain experience and learn, it allows them to expand their 
business networks, and it helps them establish valuable reputations.  Older firms are also 
better known to investors (Pastor and Veronesi, 2003; LSW) and have easier access to the 
capital market (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010).  Lenders will therefore be more willing to fund 
older firms and ask for lower risk premiums, which should contribute to a lower probability 
of financial default.   Learning, however, does not completely eliminate financial failure 
hazard.   
Since our findings are conditional on a broad set of control variables, they cannot be 
explained by age-related changes in size, profitability, financial frictions, and other 
determinants of exit vulnerability.  The extant literature, in particular, posits that takeover 
vulnerability increases if firms are managed inefficiently (Manne, 1965; Jensen 1986, 1993), 
own undervalued assets (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002), are characterized by an imbalance 
of growth opportunities and available resources (Palepu, 1986), hold large amounts of cash or 
substantial borrowing capacity (Stulz and Johnson, 1985), are subject to overinvestment 
problems (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989), or are simply small (Comment and Schwert, 1995).    
These factors are not responsible for the age effects we find.  Neither can they be explained 
by unobserved heterogeneity in the exit hazards (Thompson, 2005) or by the age of the CEO 
or that of the directors.  There is also little empirical support for the notion that the market for 
corporate control frees resources trapped in outdated structures (Schumpeter, 1975; Jensen, 
2000): Older firms that keep investing despite below-industry growth opportunities do not 
face higher takeover risk.   
A potential agency explanation for our findings could be that the managers of older 
firms actively try to keep their firms independent to protect their quasi-rents and their internal 
career opportunities or to enjoy a quiet life.  This resistance on the part of managers would 
seem to be particularly tempting, as the focusing efforts documented by LSW in older firms 
gradually reduce the value of outside employment opportunities, and because merger and 
acquisition often costs managers their jobs (see, among others, Murphy, 1997; Hartzell, Ofek, 
and Yermack, 2004).  It could therefore make sense for the managers of older firms to raise 
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formal takeover barriers with antitakeover provisions (ATP) such as staggered boards, poison 
pills, and other shark repellants.  It could also make sense to avoid the grant of golden 
parachutes to create stronger incentives to resist.  However, this agency explanation of the 
observed decline in takeover hazards is not supported by the data.  There is no evidence that 
the managers of older firms adopt structural defenses to prevent a loss of independence.  
More importantly, ATPs and golden parachutes cannot explain the age effect we observe.  
Neither can the presence of institutional blockholders. 
The managers of older firms could also deliberately make their firms less attractive 
acquisition targets by reducing their cash holdings, avoiding overinvestment, and by 
investing in firm specific assets (see, for example, Chang and Singh, 1999, and Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1989).  If this were true, however, we would expect the passage of business 
combination (BC) laws to slow down or invert the attempts at making older firms 
unattractive.  Yet that is not what we find.  To the contrary, older firms continue to exhibit 
significantly smaller increases in cash holdings after the passage of business combination 
(BC) laws.  New BC laws also do not seem to stop the efforts of older firms to streamline 
their business.  
We also find situations, however, in which the exit hazards in question increase for 
older firms.  At times of industry distress, specialized firms are more likely to face financial 
constraints (Gopalan and Xie, 2011) and unique assets realize lower liquidation proceeds 
(Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan, 2007).  Since older firms appear to specialize in what they 
do best, one would therefore expect them to be more susceptible to adverse shocks in their 
business environment.  Consistent with that, we find that financial failure hazard is positively 
related to firm age in distressed industries.  At the same time, older firms seem to become 
even less attractive merger partners.     
This paper is not the first to study exit risk.  Various studies in the industrial 
organization literature (see, for example, Caves, 1998), the empirical organization literature 
(see, for example, Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll, 2007) and the management literature (see, for 
example, Leonard-Barton, 1992) have investigated the death (exit) rates of business units in 
the context of industry and product life-cycles.  In that context, the prevalent finding is that 
plants’ failure rates decline with age.  Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989), for example, 
ascribe that phenomenon to declining uncertainty about costs.  Agarwal and Gort (1996, 
2002) explain it with a tradeoff between increasingly obsolete endowments and learning.  
Exit in those strands of the literature typically is the firm’s decision to leave a particular 
industry or a particular product market.  It does not necessarily imply that the firm ceases to 
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exist as an independent organization.  Our definition of exit differs notably from that.   We 
are interested in financial failure and merger or acquisition, the main exit forms of 
corporations as legally independent organizations.   
All things considered, the paper makes the following five contributions to the literature.  
First, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first large-scale empirical study on the relation 
between firm age and exit risk.  We find that both the financial failure and the takeover 
hazard of firms decline with age.  The results should contribute to a better understanding of 
bankruptcy and takeover as the mechanisms responsible for the reallocation of resources in 
the economy.  Second, the paper helps explain why company age matters in corporate life.  
Older firms appear to lack the resources necessary for strategic changes and innovations, a 
situation that makes them unattractive merger partners.  Third, the paper complements the 
work of LSW and provides further evidence about the existence of a corporate life cycle.  
Although the idea goes back at least to Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), there does not seem 
to be an agreement about the existence of the phenomenon let alone its rationale.  Ultimately, 
however, this study should contribute to a better understanding about the dynamics and the 
characteristics of economic growth.  Growth seems to be accompanied by frequent 
reallocations and recycling of resources via financial default and takeover.  However, and 
that is the fourth contribution, it does not look as if the market for corporate control is very 
active in recycling the resources of older firms.  The same goes for financial default.  Finally, 
our numbers show that, although the various exit hazards decline with company age, they do 
not go to zero.  That explains why, eventually, all firms disappear as independent 
organizations.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 describes the sample 
and discusses the empirical strategy.  Section 2 studies the relation between firm age and exit 
risks.   It also discusses the economic relevance of the age-related changes in exit hazards.  
Section 3 asks whether the negative relation we find could reflect an attempt by the managers 
of older firms to keep their firms independent to protect their quasi-rents.  Section 4 examines 
other specific alternative interpretations of the evidence, including whether company age is 
not simply a proxy for management age.  Section 5 investigates how shocks in the business 
environment affect exit risks.  Section 6 tests whether the age effect is driven by firms with 
BWM characteristics.  Finally, Section 7 presents conclusions. 
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2. Sample description and empirical strategy 
2.1. Sample Description 
The sample consists of all listed firms with data on CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and 
COMPUSTAT Industry Segment between 1978 and 2009.  We exclude utilities as well as 
firms in the financial sector of the economy (SIC 6000–6999).  Moreover, we ignore firm-
years with negative total assets or sales, missing data on COMPUSTAT Segments, and 
cumulative sales on the COMPUSTAT Segments tapes which deviate by more than 1% from 
the total sales reported on the COMPUSTAT tapes.  As very young firms might drive the 
results (Fama and French, 2004), we omit all firms which have been listed for less than five 
years.  We also do so because of the finding in Bhattacharya, Borisov, and Yu (2011) that 
“natal financial care” significantly affects firm mortality rates during the first years after 
listing.  In the case of VC financing, this natal care lasts for up to five years.1  We also drop 
all 3-digit SIC industry-years with fewer than five observations, as we need to estimate 
moments of the industry-wide distribution of the variables in the analysis to control for 
industry effects.  The 3-digit SIC industry definition is the one recommended by Giroud and 
Mueller (2010).  The final sample consists of 10,219 firms and 83,790 firm-years. It is the 
same sample as in LSW. 
Table 1 reports the number of firms that enter and leave the sample during the 31 years 
under investigation.  We start with 1,988 firms in 1978.  Turnover is remarkably high: 7,934 
firms enter and 6,438 firms leave between 1978 and 2009.  That corresponds to an annual rate 
of entry and exit of 9.4 percent and 7.7 percent, respectively.2  Churn is therefore 
substantially higher than in the sample of Baker and Kennedy (2002). This is mostly due to 
the fact that our sample includes the takeover waves of the late 1990s.  The results of our 
investigation remain the same, however, if we exclude the years 1996-2000.   
The table also shows the possible exit reasons based on the delisting codes reported in 
CRSP.  In the case of financial failure, we follow Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi’s (2008) 
broader failure definition and define it as liquidation (400–490), bankruptcy (574), or 
delisting for financial reasons.  The latter category applies when firms are unable to maintain 
an acceptable share-price level (552) or capitalization amount (560 and 584), or when they 
                                                 
1  The reputation of the underwriter affects firm survival for up to seven years.  Our results are qualitatively 
the same when we exclude all firms younger than 7 years in terms of listing age. 
2  Note that the sum of firms at the beginning of each subperiod plus new entries minus exits is lower than 
the number of firms at the beginning of the following subperiod.  The difference is due to the firms that 
drop out of the sample because they cease to meet our sample selection criteria.  In particular, we lose 
many observations because of the restriction of at least five firms in each industry-year.   
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fail to file financial statements or pay exchange fees (580).  As for takeover, in keeping with 
Rauh (2006), among others, we identify that event with transactions with the delisting codes 
200–290.  We are unable to tell friendly from hostile deals.  Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 
(2001), however, show that even in the 1980s, the era of hostile takeovers, the overwhelming 
majority of all deals were friendly (see also Servaes, 1991).  Moreover, Schwert (2000) finds 
that “hostility” is mainly motivated by strategic bargaining to extract higher rents, and that 
hostile and friendly deals are mostly indistinguishable in economic terms.  One should keep 
that in mind when interpreting the results.   
Forms of exit other than takeover and failure are comparatively less frequent and 
include exchanges for other securities, switches to other stock exchanges, going-private 
transactions, and delistings because of an insufficient number of shareholders or market 
makers.  The fate of these firms is not apparent from CRSP’s delisting codes.  We treat these 
firms as a separate group in our competing hazard estimation approach.  The results are fairly 
robust to alternative definitions of this group.   
Most firms are taken over or merged (3,494), consistent with Baker and Kennedy 
(2002).  Comparatively few companies (1,831) experience financial failure.  Over the whole 
sample period, takeovers therefore account for roughly 55 percent of all exits, 28 percent are 
failures, and 17 percent are other kinds of exits.  Put differently, of all 10,219 firms present at 
some time in the sample during 1978–2009, 34 percent are taken over, 18 percent fail, and 11 
percent exit for other reasons—the rest survives.     
Some of the firms that drop from the exchanges in going-private transactions may list 
again years later, for example in a reverse LBO.  Cao and Lerner (2009) identify 526 such 
transactions between 1981 and 2003.  Firms that relist are typically treated as separate firms.  
This could bias the results.  We follow the extant literature and use Compustat’s unique 
identifier (gvkey) to track companies over time in spite of name or ticker changes.  We can 
therefore measure age from the date of incorporation.  Reverse LBOs should therefore not 
represent a confounding event.  Firms typically maintain their incorporation age when they 
resurface as newly listed entities.   
 
2.2. Research strategy 
Ultimately, we want to know whether firms exhibit negative duration dependence.   However, 
negative duration dependence could also be induced by unobserved heterogeneity in exit 
hazard (e.g., Zorn, 2000).  If the exit hazards of firms are conditionally different in ways we 
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do not account for in our model, the mean hazard rate could decline with cohort age because 
the sample becomes increasingly composed of firms with the lowest exit risk, and not 
because exit risk declines with age (see also Thompson, 2005).  To address this concern, the 
first part of the empirical investigation estimates discrete time proportional hazard 
regressions with the Prentice-Gloeckler (1978) model that incorporates a gamma mixture 
distribution to summarize unobserved individual heterogeneity.  These so-called single-
destination models are estimated separately for takeover and financial failure hazard.   
Our general model has the following form: 
h(t) = 0h(t) exp(x′(t)h). 
The hazard function h(t) is defined as the probability of exit type h in year t given that the 
firm has survived up to year t–1.  0h(t) denotes the so-called baseline hazard, which is 
specific to the exit type.  x′(t) represents a set of possibly time-varying explanatory variables.  
Depending on the coefficients h, these variables shift the baseline hazard.  In the estimation, 
we allow for right censoring and correct the standard errors for heteroskedasticity as well as 
firm clustering.  Right censoring occurs because, at the end of the sample period, all we know 
is when survival time has begun but not when exit (if any) will occur.   
The basis for our analysis of financial failure hazard is the regression specification that 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) propose (their Model 7, Table 3): 
Variable Description Expected sign 
Age Number of years (plus one) since incorporation – 
Naïve PD The “naïve” default probability implied by Merton’s (1974) model + 
ln(E) The natural log of the firm’s market value of equity – 
ln(D) The natural log of the firm’s book value of debt + 
1/Vola The inverse of the standard deviation of return on the firm’s stock – 
Excess return The firm’s market-adjusted stock return.  – 
Profitability Net income divided by lagged total assets – 
 
Our takeover hazard model includes a broad range of control variables that have been found 
to correlate with takeover hazard, namely: 
  Variable Description Expected sign 
Age Number of years (plus one) since incorporation – 
Sales growth Relative change in real sales ? 
MTB-equity Market value of equity divided by its book value.  ? 
Cash Cash and short-term investments divided by the book value assets ?/+ 
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Debt ratio Book value of debt divided by market assets ?/– 
Profitability Net income divided by lagged total assets – 
Excess return Market-adjusted stock return over the previous year – 
Tangibility Property, plant, and equipment divided by book assets + 
Size Log of the market value of assets – 
Focus Herfindahl index of the firm’s segment sales + 
Industry 
concentration 
Herfindahl index of the sales of all firms in the same 3-digit SIC 
industry – 
bActive industry Indicator variable for industries (4-digit SIC) with takeover activity in the previous year + 
GDP growth The relative change in the real U.S. gross domestic product + 
 
Sales growth, equity market-to-book ratios, cash holdings, and debt ratios reflect growth 
opportunities as well as potential imbalances between growth and available resources (see, 
for example, Palepu 1986).  Their effect cannot be signed a priori.  Low debt levels and large 
cash holdings could also be proxies for free cash flow problems, which could attract takeover 
(Jensen, 1986).  Profitability and excess return are related to management efficiency and 
reduce takeover threat (Jensen, 1988; Scharfstein, 1988).  Asset tangibility (Stulz and 
Johnson, 1985) increases borrowing capacity and, therefore, should invite takeover.  Large 
(Palepu 1986) and diversified (Agarwal and Gort 1996, 1999, 2002) firms should face lower 
takeover risk because of the higher integration costs.  Finally, greater competition should 
increase takeover threat (Kole and Lehn, 1997, 1999) and an expanding economy. 
Throughout the analysis, all regression arguments are lagged by one year, since exit 
presumably reacts to its determining factors with a lag.  Moreover, to control for industry- 
and period-specific effects, we standardize all firm-specific variables by industry (using 
three-digit SIC industry definitions, as recommended by Giroud and Mueller, 2010) and year.  
The exceptions in the standardization are the variables related to company age and Merton 
model’s “naïve” default probability.  Standardization means, we deduct the 3-digit SIC 
industry average and divide by the industry standard deviation in any given year.  
Standardized variables are denoted with the prefix s-.  When interpreting the evidence, it is 
important to remember this adjustment.  Binary variables have the prefix b-.  
Financial failure and takeover could also be competing hazards.  Powell and Yawson 
(2007) show that ignoring competing risks can lead to estimation bias.  That could occur if 
firms, for example, file for bankruptcy to avoid takeover or if takeover serves as an 
alternative crisis resolution mechanism to financial failure (Stiglitz, 1972; Shrievens and 
Stevens, 1979; Pastena and Ruland, 1986; Jensen, 2000).  We therefore also investigate the 
relation between firm age and survival in the context of discrete-time competing risk 
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proportional hazard models.  When doing so, we assume that the risk of financial distress 
conditional on the effect of the covariates in the model (in particular profitability) is 
independent of the risk of takeover.  The model is implemented as a pooled multinomial 
logistic model (Jenkins, 2005; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), an approach that offers the 
advantage that the likelihood function can be computed more easily.  The drawback is that it 
does not incorporate unobserved heterogeneity.   
  
 
2.3. Variable Definitions 
For listed firms, there are two common definitions of firm age, namely the number of years 
(plus one) elapsed since the company’s IPO year (listing age) and the number of years (plus 
one) elapsed since the year of incorporation (incorporation age).  Listing age is computed 
with CRSP data.  Information about the firm’s incorporation age is partly from Jay Ritter’s 
website and partly hand-collected from Mergent Webreports.  Because firms are subject to 
exit risk from the day they start, most of the analysis is carried out with incorporation age.  
The results, however, remain essentially unchanged when we focus on listing age. 
Table 2 shows average incorporation age and, for comparison, listing age.  Since CRSP 
goes back to 1925, the theoretically maximum listing age at the beginning of the sample 
period in 1978 is 54 years, compared with 85 years at the end of it, in 2009.  In the full 
sample, average listing age is 17 and average incorporation age is 34 (the median values are 
13 and 25, respectively).  As it turns out, average incorporation age at the time of listing 
varies substantially over time (see also Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001; Fink, Fink, Grullon, 
and Weston, 2010).       
To reduce the influence of outliers, we winsorize all control variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentile of their pooled distribution.  All variables are measured at year end.  Descriptive 
statistics are in Table 2 and variable definitions in Table 13.  Table 3 computes correlation 
coefficients between pairs of control variables.  Older firms, in terms of incorporation age, 
are larger, report more segments, hold less cash, and have lower stock return volatility (see 
also Pastor and Veronesi, 2003).  To examine the impact of aging on exit hazards, it is 
therefore important to control for the possible effect of the variables that company age 
correlates with. 
   
 page 11 
 
3. Firm age and exit risk 
3.1. Financial failure hazard 
Table 4 estimates single destination models for financial failure hazard. Model 1 simply 
replicates the model of Bharath and Shumway (2008).  The signs of the control variables are 
congruent with the findings in that paper.  According to the results, greater equity 
capitalization, and larger excess returns all reduce the odds of financial failure.  The same is 
true of higher profitability, as in Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008).  In contrast, a 
greater Naïve PD, higher debt levels, and increased stock return volatility raise those odds.   
The hypothesis we want to test is whether company age has a negative impact on the 
probability of financial failure of older firms.  The age coefficients of the regression 
specifications 2 to 6 are consistent with this prediction.  Model 2 omits all control variables 
and shows that firm age, measured as the log of incorporation age (ln(Age)),  has a negative 
and significant association with failure hazard.  When we add the control variables back, firm 
age maintains its negative coefficient (Model 3).  The magnitude of the coefficient of ln(Age), 
however, drops by more than half.  This indicates that firm age is correlated in part with other 
drivers of exit risk, such as size and financial frictions.  It also implies, however, that age has 
an impact on failure unrelated with these variables.  As mentioned above, this could reflect 
learning by the firm or its investors.  Note that failure rates decline with age regardless of the 
functional form we choose.  We use alternatively: –1/(1+Age), the age metric proposed by 
Pastor and Veronesi (2003) (Model 4); Age and Age2 (Model 5); and the binary variable, 
bOld, that identifies firms older than the sample median in any given year (Model 6).  The 
coefficients of the control variables are mostly unaffected by the different specification of the 
age relation. 
 
3.2. Takeover hazard 
Table 5 studies the relation between firm age and takeover hazard.  As in the case of failure 
hazard, the first specification (Model 1) focuses on the various control variables and omits 
firm age.  The estimates imply that takeover risk is lower for firms with better growth 
opportunities (s Sales growth; s MTB-equity) and for firms with larger cash holdings.  
Contrary to the hypothesis that takeover disciplines poorly performing firms, however, we 
find that takeover hazard is actually higher for firms with stronger operating performance (s 
Profitability) and stronger stock market performance (s Excess return).  The latter finding is 
consistent with Baker and Kennedy (2002), who show that stocks perform particularly well in 
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the year prior to takeover, an indication that market participants suspect the firm is in play.  
We are, however, controlling for other dimensions of profitability such as sales growth; as it 
turns out, stronger Sales growth reduces the odds of a takeover.  The fact that focus has a 
positive coefficient could mean that acquirers prefer pure players because of the costs of 
unwinding undesired activities and divisions.  The positive coefficient associated with 
stronger economic growth suggests that the reallocation of resources via merger is livelier 
during boom phases of the economy.  Not surprisingly, that reallocation is also more vigorous 
in less concentrated and hence potentially more competitive industries.  Size, leverage, and 
asset tangibility are unrelated with takeover risk. 
We hypothesized that takeover rates should fall with firm age because firms become 
relatively unattractive merger partners.  Model 2 to 6 test this prediction with different 
functional measures of age.  The results are consistent with the prediction.  The coefficient of 
age is always negative and significant, regardless of how we measure firm age and whether or 
not we include the control variables.  Interestingly, the coefficient of age does not drop 
dramatically when we include the control variables.  At the same time, adding the age 
argument leaves the coefficients of the control variables mostly unaffected.  Company age is 
therefore orthogonal to the included drivers of takeover risk.  
 
3.3. Non-parametric regressions 
The fact that few firms survive over time makes it harder to assess exit risk at old age.  To 
find out more about the actual form of the relation between firm age and exit hazard, we 
estimate kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions.  This nonparametric approach allows 
for an unspecified relation between the two dimensions of interest.  Figure 1 plots the results 
of this analysis.  The dependent variables in these regressions are the residuals from separate 
logistic regressions of the two exit hazards (failure and takeover) on the control variables 
from Table 4 (failure) and Table 5 (takeover), respectively.  The shaded area shows the 90% 
confidence interval.  To limit the impact of outliers at higher age, we truncate the sample at 
incorporation age 75, the 90th-percentile of the age distribution, a procedure that is consistent 
with Agarwal and Gort (2002).   
The results of the estimation confirm that both failure and takeover hazards decline 
over time.  Takeover hazard seems to rebound slightly around age 40, but the increase is not 
statistically significant.  Failure hazard bottoms out around age 45, which marks the 75th 
percentile of the pooled distribution of incorporation age, but doesn’t pick up again.  In what 
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follows, we revert to parametric regressions.  We measure age alternatively with the log of 
incorporation age and with the binary variable that identifies firms older than the sample 
median. 
 
3.4. Competing risk regressions 
As mentioned above, single destination models could produce biased estimates if the possible 
exit risks are competing.  To avoid such bias, we reassess the age-dependency of exit risk in 
the context of competing risk regressions.  We distinguish the three exit routes from Table 1.  
The dependent variable is therefore equal to 0 if the firm survives (the base outcome), 1 if the 
firm is taken over, 2 if the firm fails, and 3 if it exits for other reasons.  The category “other 
reasons” is included for econometric purposes and is not reported separately in any of the 
following tables.  The regression arguments combine those of the single destination models in 
Tables 4 and 5.  We drop, however, the market value of equity and the book value of debt to 
avoid collinearity with firm size.   
Table 6 shows the results.  The first regression specification focuses on firm age and 
excludes all control variables.  Regressions 2 to 4 then study the age-dependence of exit risk 
conditional on the various control variables and with different functional forms of age. As it 
turns out, the relation between exit hazards and age does not change when we switch from 
single destination models to competing risk regressions.  All specifications produce a 
negative and significant relation between firm age and either type of exit risk.  Moreover, the 
age coefficients are statistically identical to the ones from the single destination models.  
Therefore, competition of exit risks does not seem to be of major concern for our 
investigation.  However, and for the same reason, neither should be unobserved 
heterogeneity.   
By combining the control variables from the failure and the takeover models, we have 
some new coefficient estimates.  In the specification of takeover hazard, the two new control 
variables are Naïve PD and stock return volatility.  The coefficient of Naïve PD is negative 
and significant.  This finding is inconsistent with the hypothesis that takeover is a substitute 
crisis-resolution mechanism (Stiglitz, 1972; Shrievens and Stevens, 1979; Pastena and 
Ruland, 1986).  It is possible, however, that mergers are only last-ditch crisis resolution 
possibilities, after financial failure has occurred.  If so, failing firms will exit the sample 
before we can observe the subsequent mergers, which means that we aren’t able to measure 
the relation in question.  Volatility leaves takeover risk unaffected.   
 page 14 
 
In the specification of failure hazard, there are a number of new control variables as 
well.  Sales growth, cash balances, size, and GDP growth reduce the probability of financial 
failure.  We also find that MTB ratios and leverage increase the odds of financial failure.  The 
same applies to bActive industry, an indication that industries with takeover events are 
industries of corporate restructuring in general.  Tangibility of assets and focus have no 
effect, and neither has industry concentration.   
 
3.5. The impact of age on survival  
We can use the coefficient estimates of model 2 in Table 6 to predict the marginal 
contribution of age to the two exit hazards of interest and assess the economic significance of 
the relation.  Table 7 performs this analysis.  All variables except for ln(Age) are kept at their 
average sample value.  The first line of the table shows predicted failure and takeover hazards 
at incorporation age 5 (ln(Age) = 1.6094).  The second line shows predicted failure and 
takeover hazards at the median incorporation age 25 (ln(Age) = 3.2189).  The average 
difference is –0.67 percentage points in the case of failure hazard, and –0.92 percentage 
points in the case of takeover hazard.  This represents a 25% decline in failure hazard and a 
19% reduction in takeover hazard.  The lower bound on the 95% confidence interval 
corresponds to a relative decline of 39% in failure hazard and one of 31% in takeover hazard.  
Hence, the effect of company age appears to be economically palpable.  An alternative way 
to see this is to compute the increase in the life expectancy of older firms that our estimates 
imply.  An aggregate hazard of 5.84% in the typical 25-year old firm means that it will die 
before age 75 with probability 0.95—5.84% is the sum of the financial default and takeover 
hazard estimated for these firms (1.99% and 3.85%, respectively).  In contrast, an aggregate 
hazard of 7.43% for 5-year old firms implies death with 0.95 probability already before age 
44—7.43% is the sum of their financial default and takeover hazards (2.66% and 4.77%, 
respectively).  Older firms therefore expect to live significantly longer as independent 
organizations.  
Overall, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that older firms are unattractive 
acquisition targets and that they learn over time.  Some alternative interpretations of the 
evidence have indirectly been addressed by the control variables in the regressions.  For 
example, since we control for profitability, the fact that older firms have comparatively lower 
profitability (LSW) cannot explain the negative relation between age and exit hazard.  
Similarly, size, cash holdings, or leverage cannot explain our findings either.  The next two 
 page 15 
 
sections investigate whether the evidence concerning a declining conditional takeover hazard 
over time can be explained by the desire of management to maintain independence to protect 
their quasi-rents, whether it can be explained by an imbalance of growth opportunities and 
available resources, and whether company age is simply a proxy for the age of management.       
 
4. Firm age and the pursuit of independence 
According to Murphy (1997) and Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004), among others, the 
managers of target firms often lose their jobs in the aftermath of an acquisition.  This 
prospect could be particularly threatening to the managers of older organizations, since the 
focusing process that older firms engage in (LSW) could gradually reduce the value of their 
outside employment opportunities.  Remaining with the firm could progressively become the 
most valuable employment option.  Therefore, an agency interpretation of the evidence could 
be that the managers of older firms try to keep their organizations alive and independent to 
protect their quasi-rents and their internal career opportunities or to enjoy a quiet life.  One 
way to do so is to raise formal anti-takeover barriers.  Alternatively, they could deliberately 
make their firms unattractive targets of corporate acquisitions.  What follows examines these 
two possibilities. 
Anti-takeover barriers take mostly the form of antitakeover provisions (ATP) in the 
corporate charter and the corporate bylaws.  There are two main rationales for ATPs in the 
literature and both are predicated on the assumption that ATPs have the potential to increase 
the costs of takeover.  The first relates to managerial entrenchment and the attempt to stave 
off takeover.  Field and Karpoff (2002) examine ATPs during the first five years after listing 
and find that their presence reduces the probability of acquisition.  Other empirical studies 
with different samples reach different conclusions (e.g., Comment and Schwert, 1995, and 
Core, Guay, and Rusticus, 2006).3  The second rationale for the existence of ATPs claims that 
they confer management better bargaining power in merger negotiations (Grossman and Hart, 
1980, DeAngelo and Rice, 1983, and Harris, 1990).  This rationale has no obvious 
implications for the probability of takeover, since ATPs signal willingness to entertain offers.  
Either way, ATPs should have a deterring potential.   
We test whether older firms are more likely to protect themselves with ATPs.  We also 
test whether these managers have stronger incentives to resist merger and acquisition in the 
                                                 
3 For a comprehensive review of the literature, see Klepper and Thompson (2006). 
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absence of golden parachutes that deploy in the case of takeover.  Furthermore, we ask 
whether they actively try to make their firms unattractive merger and acquisition targets. 
 
4.1. The relevance of structural takeover defenses 
In principle, poison pills are the most formidable defense against takeover there is.  As it 
turns out, ever since the Delaware Supreme Court stated that pills were legitimate in 1985, 
almost all firms can adopt one very quickly even after a takeover bid has been made (Coates, 
2000).  Almost all companies therefore have a “shadow pill” readily available.  In fact, 
almost all firms have charter provisions in place authorizing blank check preferred stock, “the 
most common source of the securities used to create a poison pill,” when they go public 
(Daines and Klausner, 2001, pp. 114-115).  The shadow pill has made other defenses, such as 
fair price and supermajority vote provisions, unimportant (Coates, 2000).  The problem is that 
it only takes a board decision to repeal a poison pill.  Hence, to be a credible defense 
mechanism, a poison pill has to be accompanied by provisions that make it difficult for the 
bidding party to replace an incumbent board—or there must be provisions that protect a board 
likely to adopt a poison pill in the case of a takeover bid.   
Following Daines and Klausner (2001), we examine ATPs that can “delay a hostile bid 
above and beyond the ubiquitous pill” (p. 88): dual-class stock, staggered board, and inability 
of shareholders to act by written consent or to call a special meeting.  We also examine 
poison pills and blank check preferred stock authorizations.  Even though the shadow pill is 
ubiquitous, pills that are in place or ostensibly readily deployable could be an important 
signal of the board’s intentions to resist takeover, especially when combined with staggered 
boards.  Finally, we test whether older firms are less likely to grant their managers golden 
parachutes to encourage them to resist mergers and acquisitions.  Data on governance 
provisions are from Risk Metrics.   
We also examine the presence of institutional blockholders and test whether it offsets 
the influence of possibly entrenched managers and directors and increases the takeover 
hazard of older firms.  The relative absence of such blockholders in older firms could explain 
our results.  Data on institutional ownership are from CDA Spectrum.  As in Cremers and 
Nair (2004), institutional blockholders own more than 5 percent of the outstanding shares.  
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4.2. Antitakeover protection at old age 
Panel A of Table 8 reports the popularity of the various antitakeover devices.  Because Risk 
Metrics starts in 1990, the sample period is 1990 – 2009.  More than 90 percent of all firms 
have either a poison pill or a blank check preferred stock authorization in place.  This is 
comparable with what Daines and Klausner (2001) report for their IPO firms.  The frequency 
of the other provisions is similarly comparable to that of previous studies.  About 10 percent 
of the sample firms have multiple classes of stock, almost 60 percent have staggered boards 
(almost always in combination with pills or blank check preferred stock), and almost 40 
percent have voting restrictions.  Golden parachutes are granted in about 60 percent of the 
cases.  Finally, there are institutional blockholdings in almost 4 out of every 10 firms in the 
sample.     
To test whether old firms are more likely to have these antitakeover provisions in place, 
we run conditional logistic regressions of binary variables that flag the existence of any given 
provision on firm age and the control variables from the takeover model in Table 5.  We 
include industry-year fixed effects to account for time and industry effects.  For each ATP, 
we estimate two separate regressions with two alternative measures of incorporation age, 
namely ln(Age) and bOld.  Because of space limitations, we report only the coefficients 
associated with age (also Panel A of Table 8).     
According to the evidence, older firms are more likely to have dual-class stock, which, 
in principle, enables incumbent managers and directors to maintain control.  As shown above, 
however, this ownership structure is fairly rare to begin with.  All the remaining evidence is 
inconsistent with entrenched managers and directors in old firms.  In particular, older firms 
are actually less likely to have staggered boards.  They are also less likely to have pills or to 
combine staggered boards with pills.  In addition, they are less prone to restrict the ability of 
their shareholders to act by written consent or the power to call special meetings (b Voting 
restriction).  Similarly, they more often give their top managers golden parachutes.  
Consistent with all that, the last line of the panel shows that institutional blockholdings 
appear to be more widespread in older firms, although this finding holds only when 
measuring firm age with ln(Age).    
Taken together, the results therefore imply that firms are generally fairly well protected 
from takeover.  However, and contrary to the hypothesis of managerial entrenchment in older 
firms, takeover protection is weaker there.  There is little evidence that older firms erect 
takeover barriers to maintain independence.     
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To confirm these findings, we test whether the actual introduction or removal of 
antitakeover provisions is related to company age.  This test relies on logistic regressions in 
which the dependent variable equals 1 if a given firm adopts or removes a particular 
antitakeover provision in a given year, and equals 0 otherwise.  Firms that have a specific 
provision in place are excluded in the analysis of adoptions; conversely, those that do not 
have a given provision are excluded in the analysis of removals.  The regression arguments 
include the old firm dummy (bOld) and the standard set of control variables from Table 5.  
As before, we report only the coefficient of company age (Panel B of Table 8).  Overall, and 
consistent with Panel A, we find little evidence that older firms beef up their structural 
takeover defenses.  If anything, the weight of the evidence is the opposite.  Older firms are 
less likely to put poison pills in place, and more inclined to remove staggered boards and to 
dismantle the combination of staggered boards and poison pills.  They also tend to eliminate 
voting restrictions.  There is, however, some evidence that golden parachutes become 
marginally more popular and that institutional investors reduce their holdings in older firms. 
 
4.3. Antitakeover protections and takeover risk 
The fact that older firms have fewer ATPs in place and seem to break them down over time 
does not imply that they don’t benefit from the ATPs they do have.  These ATPs could have 
been responsible for their survival.  We therefore test whether the age effect found in the 
hazard regressions can be explained by the presence of ATPs.  We repeat the estimation of 
the regressions in Table 6 with the addition of the various ATPs discussed in Table 8.  
Because almost all firms have a pill or a blank check preferred stock, we include these 
provisions only in combination with staggered boards.  
Table 9 shows the estimates that refer to takeover hazard.  As one can see, the addition 
of ATP dummies to the regression arguments does not erase the significance of the age 
coefficient (regressions 1 to 5).  If anything, that coefficient becomes numerically stronger.  
Interestingly, the various structural defenses have essentially no impact on the probability of 
takeover.  Golden parachutes, however, appear to predispose firms to accept being acquired 
or merged, and so does the presence of an institutional blockholder.   
Regression 6 includes all takeover provisions simultaneously and produces consistent 
estimates.  Finally, regression 7 asks whether the various provisions could have different 
effects in young versus old firms.  To this end, we interact each individual provision with 
bOld and add these interaction terms to the regression.  The conclusions, however, do not 
 page 19 
 
change.  The relation between firm age and takeover hazard remains negative, equally strong 
(if not stronger), and statistically significant.  None of the takeover provisions and their 
interaction terms is significantly different from zero at customary levels of confidence.  The 
only coefficient that remains positive and significant is that associated with the presence of 
golden parachutes.   
Overall, there is no evidence that older firms boost their defenses over time.  More 
important, ATPs are unable to explain the age effect we find.  The observed decline in exit 
hazard seems to be unrelated to any preference for independence that the managers of older 
firms might have.     
 
4.4. Informal antitakeover defenses 
The alternative agency explanation of the evidence we mentioned is that the managers of 
older firms take deliberate actions to render their firms unattractive merger partners.  Shleifer 
and Vishny (1989) argue, for example, that managers can entrench themselves by making 
manager-specific investments.  With a similar logic, older firms could avoid accumulating or 
wasting free cash flows, and they could focus their activities to avoid attracting takeover.  If 
so, an exogenous reduction in takeover threat should induce them to relax these activities.  
The passage of business combination (BC) laws represents such an exogenous shock (see 
also LSW).   
In untabulated tests, we investigated whether the passage of BC laws is accompanied 
by a comparative increase in cash holdings and a reduction of cash payouts to stockholders.  
Moreover, we tested whether the focusing efforts of older firms in the form of the sale of 
non-core assets slow down with that event.  Neither, however, is the case.   
 
5. Other interpretations of the age effect on takeover hazard 
There are other alternative interpretations of the evidence concerning the takeover hazard one 
could offer.  Palepu (1986) and Powell and Yawson (2007), for example, argue that takeover 
threats materialize because of an imbalance between growth opportunities and available 
resources.  If these imbalances declined over time, company age could be a proxy for them.  
Panel A of Table 10 tests that possibility.    We assume there is an imbalance between growth 
and available resources (bGrowth-resource imbalance) when a firm exhibits one of the 
following characteristics: a) below-average growth opportunities and above-average cash 
holdings; or b) above-average growth opportunities and below-average cash holdings.  We 
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add this new variable to our standard competing risk model in Table 6 (Model 4).  Moreover, 
we interact it with bOld as well as with the control variables.  For reading convenience, the 
panel shows only the coefficient of firm age, the coefficient of the variable in question, and 
the coefficient of the interaction term with bOld.  The results show that bOld maintains its 
negative and significant coefficient, which suggests that the age effect is unrelated to 
imbalances between growth and resources.  Interestingly, both bGrowth-resource imbalance 
and its interaction with bOld have coefficients that are statistically zero.  Therefore, 
imbalances between growth and resources do not seem to be a significant determining factor 
of takeover risk. 
It could also be that the market for corporate control frees resources trapped in 
inadequate structures (Schumpeter, 1975; Jensen, 2000).  If this situation became less acute 
over time, it would correlate with firm age and could explain our results.  We measure 
trapped resources with an interaction term of high discretionary investments and low growth 
opportunities.  Discretionary investments are, alternatively, R&D activities and capital 
expenditures (see, for example, Minton and Schrand, 1999).  We add the interaction term to 
our competing risk model.  We also interact it with bOld.  The results of the two regressions 
are in Panel B of the table.  As one can see, the coefficient of company age is unaffected.  It 
remains negative and significant.  We also find that firms that keep investing despite modest 
growth opportunities do not face significantly higher exit risk, not even when they are older.  
It does not look as if the market for corporate control is particularly active in freeing trapped 
resources.   
Finally, Panel C investigates whether the firm age effect we observe could be related to 
the age of the management team.  LSW report that older firms have older managers.  To the 
extent that older managers are more likely to cling to their jobs and resist loss of 
independence, what looks like a firm age effect could actually be a management age effect.  
To find out, we collect data on CEO and director age from ExecuComp and Risk Metrics, 
respectively.4  We then reestimate the competing risk model with the alternative addition of 
two binary variables that measure above average ages of CEO and directors, respectively.  
According to the panel, firms with old boards (first row, bOld board) face indeed a 
significantly lower takeover risk.  Also firms with old CEOs (second row, bOld CEO) face a 
slightly lower hazard, although the coefficient is significant only in a one-sided test.  More 
important, however, the coefficient of firm age remains negative and significant in both 
                                                 
4  Data on CEO age start in 1992, and data on director age are available from 1996. 
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regressions.  If anything, it is numerically larger.  Moreover, the interaction terms of firm age 
and age of CEO and directors are statistically insignificant.  The company age effect we 
observe is therefore a separate effect, independent of the effect that the age of the people in 
the organization seems to have. 
 
6. Industry distress, firm age, and exit risk 
The argument so far is that, since they run out of growth opportunities and increasingly focus 
on what they do best (LSW), and since they don’t seem to be affected by comparatively large 
agency problems, older firms are unattractive merger partners or acquisition targets.  If so, 
that should be particularly the case during times of industry distress.  What follows explains 
why and tests that prediction.   
Several recent papers investigate how firms are affected by shocks in their business 
environment.  For example, Gopalan and Xie (2011) find that diversified firms are more 
likely to avoid financing constraints in times of industry distress because they can cross-
subsidize distressed activities with cash flows from non-distressed business lines.  Similarly, 
Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) document that industry distress makes it harder for 
firms to dispose of unique assets.  Since older firms tend to be specialized with little excess 
cash, we would expect them to find it particularly hard to refinance themselves internally or 
via asset liquidation in times of industry distress.  This should lead to higher failure rates of 
older firms.  At the same time, the market for corporate control should have particularly little 
appetite for older firms and their comparatively low growth opportunities when the whole 
industry is not doing well. 
Table 11 tests these predictions.  We follow Opler and Titman (1994) and Gopalan and 
Xie (2011), among others, and classify an industry as distressed if median sales growth is 
negative and median stock return is below –30 percent.  As in the other studies, industry 
distress is quite rare and occurs in approximately 4 percent of all cases.  The first regression 
specification (M-Logit 1) extends the competing risk regression 4 from Table 6 with a binary 
variable that identifies firm years in distressed industries, bIndustry distress, and interacts that 
variable with the old-firm dummy, bOld.  When we do so, the coefficient of bOld remains 
negative for both hazards.  Moreover, in the case of takeover, the negative and significant 
coefficient of the interaction term bOld × bIndustry distress indicates that the hazard is 
further reduced if the industry is in distress.  Therefore, older firms appear to be particularly 
unattractive merger partners in distressed industries, consistent with the prediction.  Note 
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that, conditional on the variables in the model, industry distress itself does not seem to affect 
takeover risk.  As shown below, however, this depends on the regression specification.  The 
evidence is also consistent with the prediction of an increased failure hazard.  The interaction 
term bOld × bIndustry distress is positive and highly significant.  Here, too, the coefficient of 
bIndustry distress is positive but statistically insignificant at customary levels in a two-sided 
test.     
In the first regression specification, we restrict the coefficients of the control variables 
to be the same in distressed and non-distressed industries.  In the second regression 
specification (M-Logit 2) we relax this restriction and include bIndustry distress with all 
control variables.  The age-related coefficients, however, remain essentially the same.  
Interestingly, the coefficients of the variable that identifies distressed industries are now 
negative and significant across hazard types.  We also performed the estimation only for 
firms in distressed industries (M-Logit 3).  The age coefficient is still negative and 
significant—its value corresponds roughly to the age coefficient in the preceding 
specifications plus the coefficient of the interaction term between age and the distressed 
industries dummy.  We therefore conclude that, in times of industry distress, old age 
accelerates failure hazard and reduces takeover hazard substantially.  
 
7. BWM characteristics and the age effect on takeover hazard  
The characteristics of older firms implied by LSW are low growth opportunities and 
comparatively little uncertainty about their business models (and therefore easier 
replicability).  The last step in our analysis tests whether the age effect on takeover hazard we 
uncover is driven by these particular firms with BWM characteristics.   
To perform the analysis, we estimate the competing risk model in Table 6 (Model 4) 
with the addition of a binary variable that identifies these firms.  We measure growth 
opportunities as the fraction of the share price that cannot be explained by the value of the 
firm’s equity in place. To compute the value of the equity in place, we follow Richardson 
(2006).  Business risk is approximated with the volatility of the firm’s assets, using a 
definition similar to that used in Bharath and Shumway (2008).  With this information, we 
define the interaction variable bLow growth & stable that identifies firms with below-average 
growth opportunities and below-average business uncertainty.  BWM-type firms are 
identified by interacting this variable with bOld.  We also add interaction terms of bOld with 
the remaining control variables.     
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For simplicity, the Table 12 shows only the coefficient of firm age (bOld), the 
coefficient of bLow growth & stable, and the coefficient of the interaction term of these two 
binary variables.  As a comparison, the panel also reports the company age coefficient from 
the original regression specification in Table 6.  As one can see, adding the variable bLow 
growth & stable causes the coefficient of old age to lose its statistical significance.  The 
coefficient of bLow growth & stable per se is also statistically zero.  Low growth and stability 
per se do not induce or discourage corporate restructuring.  The combination of bLow growth 
& stable and bOld, however, is negative and significant.  It is the older firms with low growth 
opportunities and stability that are unattractive targets of corporate restructuring.  It is these 
firms that drive the negative age effect on takeover hazard.  The results remain the same 
when we use alternative definitions of growth opportunities.  For example, we use sales 
growth or the difference between the firm’s share price minus the present value of a level 
perpetuity of cash payouts (in percentage of the share price).   The results are also robust with 
respect to alternative measures of performance, such as stock returns.   
 
8. Conclusions   
We started out with the question of how company age affects the exit hazards of firms.  
Takeover and financial failure hazard should increase because firms gradually run out of 
growth opportunities as they get older.  The evidence does not support this prediction.  Both 
hazards of takeover and financial failure drop significantly with firm age.  The decline in exit 
hazard is mainly driven by the tendency of older firms to become BWM (old age, low growth 
opportunities, and replicable business models), a situation that discourages takeover.  
Learning explains why failure hazards decline.  The effects, however, are not strong enough 
to reduce those exit hazards to zero.  This explains why firms do not make it to older age.  
Eventually, all lose their independence and are either liquidated or recycled in new 
organizations.   
We do not find any evidence that older firms actively try to resist recycling and protect 
themselves against takeover with corporate charter provisions.  Moreover, the ATPs they do 
have cannot explain the company age effect we document.  Hence, there is little reason to 
believe that the decline in exit hazards over time reflects a managerial preference for 
independence or a quiet life.   
Our findings imply at least three considerations.  First, exit hazards decline during the 
course of a company’s life, although they don’t go to zero.   Interestingly, in biology, the 
 page 24 
 
probability of death is a convex function of age.  In the case of firms, that probability declines 
more or less monotonically.  Second, the lower takeover hazard of older firms does not seem 
to be the result of active resistance by firm managers but rather the reflection of the fact that 
older firms are comparatively unattractive merger partners.  Hence, not only do older firms 
run out of profitable investment opportunities, they also become unattractive corporate 
investment opportunities themselves.  Third, older firms are more likely to survive in spite of 
the fact that they are unable to replicate their original success.  Hence, the “perennial gale of 
creative destruction” that sweeps over the economy (Schumpeter, 1975) seems to abate when 
it comes to older companies.  
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Figure 1: The Relation Between Age and Exit Hazard: Kernel Regressions 
The figure investigates the relation between age and exit hazards with kernel-weighted local polynomial 
regressions. The dependent variables in these regressions are the residuals from logistic regressions of the two 
exit hazards (failure and takeover) on the control variables from the first model in Table 4 (failure) Table 5 
(takeover), respectively.  The smoothed values represented in the graph are then obtained from local polynomial 
regressions of these residuals on firm age, using an Epanechnikov kernel function with a “rule-of-thumb” 
bandwidth estimator and local-mean smoothing.  The shaded area shows the 90% confidence interval.  The 
sample period is 1978 – 2009.   
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Table 1: Turnover and Exit Reasons 
The table distinguishes various subperiods and shows the number of sample firms at the beginning of each 
period as well as the number of entering and exiting firms. The last three columns to the right show the reasons 
why firms leave the sample. Using the delisting codes reported on the CRSP tapes, we distinguish among three 
exit reasons: takeover, failure, and other reasons.  Failure is assumed if a firm is liquidated (delisting codes 400–
490), drops from the exchange because of bankruptcy (574), or fails to maintain an acceptable share-price level 
(552) or capitalization (560 and 584), fails to file financial statements, or fails to pay exchange fees (580). 
Takeovers are identified with the delisting codes 200–299.  “Other” delistings are mainly exchanges for other 
securities, switches to other stock exchanges, or delistings because of an insufficient number of shareholders or 
market makers.  The sample period is 1978 – 2009. 
 
Period Firms 
Beginning 
New 
Entrants 
Total Exits Exit Reasons 
Takeover Failure Other 
       
1978–1984 2,324 1276 788 488 107 193 
1985–1989 2,414 1512 1,042 532 279 231 
1990–1994 2,777 1315 834 329 387 118 
1995–1999 3,030 1928 1,364 825 339 200 
2000–2004 3,018 1435 1,303 606 495 202 
2005–2009 2,611 468 1,107 714 224 169 
       
Total  7,934 6,438 3,494 1,831 1,113 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
The table provides descriptive statistics for the variables of relevance in the analysis.  All control variables are 
winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile of their pooled distribution across all firm-years. Variable definitions 
are in Table 13. 
 
 Mean Median Min Max Stev N 
       
 Company Age 
Listing age 17.5 13.0 5.0 85.0 13.91 83,790 
Incorporation age 34.4 25.0 5.0 193.0 26.01 69,982 
Age at listing 16.4 9.0 19.9 1.0 156.0 7,590 
 
 Control Variables 
bActive industry 0.475 – – – – 83,238 
Cash 0.153 0.074 0.000 0.840 0.187 83,787 
Debt 360.359 23.128 0.000 7804.689 1,100.246 83,532 
Debt ratio 0.192 0.147 0.000 0.727 0.184 83,532 
Equity 1,266.421 129.947 1.589 28,390.150 3,854.685 83,790 
Excess return 0.033 -0.113 -0.977 4.314 0.772 82,589 
Focus 0.836 1.000 0.245 1.000 0.241 83,790 
GDP growth 0.029 0.032 -0.026 0.072 0.019 83,790 
Industry concentration 0.207 0.161 0.029 0.965 0.157 81,280 
MTB-Equity 2.475 1.627 -9.006 24.042 3.736 83,787 
Naïve PD 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.905 0.204 70,540 
Profitability -0.010 0.039 -1.056 0.364 0.207 82,408 
Sales growth 0.098 0.040 -0.705 2.638 0.415 82,894 
Size 2,076.478 236.119 4.499 44,174.280 6,101.449 83,790 
Tangibility 0.297 0.243 0.009 0.895 0.223 83,725 
Volatility 0.152 0.140 0.050 0.362 0.066 81,874 
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Table 3: Correlations between Pairs of Variables  
 
 
Age 
(list) Age 
bAct. 
ind Cash Debt 
Debt 
ratio Equity 
Excess 
return Focus 
GDP 
growth 
Ind. 
Conc. 
MTB-
equity 
Naïve 
PD 
Profita-
bility 
Sales 
growth Size 
Tangibi-
lity 
Age 0.616 1.000 
bActive ind -0.154 -0.218 1.000 
Cash -0.150 -0.223 0.188 1.000 
Debt 0.401 0.247 -0.028 -0.125 1.000 
Debt ratio -0.002 0.030 -0.090 -0.368 0.151 1.000 
Equity 0.378 0.232 -0.002 -0.023 0.704 -0.126 1.000 
Excess return -0.037 -0.049 0.017 0.090 -0.027 -0.148 -0.006 1.000 
Focus -0.321 -0.271 0.104 0.137 -0.177 -0.041 -0.158 0.012 1.000 
GDP growth -0.011 -0.001 0.050 -0.054 -0.023 -0.008 -0.008 -0.065 0.010 1.000 
Ind. Conc. 0.064 0.123 -0.313 -0.162 -0.009 0.074 -0.032 -0.022 -0.065 0.000 1.000 
MTB-equity -0.030 -0.077 0.074 0.175 0.017 -0.242 0.152 0.169 0.049 0.020 -0.052 1.000 
Naïve PD -0.100 -0.106 0.002 -0.134 -0.017 0.557 -0.129 -0.043 0.061 -0.087 0.012 -0.149 1.000 
Profitability 0.147 0.201 -0.121 -0.218 0.073 -0.074 0.141 0.099 -0.107 0.030 0.091 -0.074 -0.231 1.000 
Sales growth -0.102 -0.122 0.063 0.081 -0.006 -0.084 0.016 0.123 0.046 0.100 -0.038 0.142 -0.128 0.013 1.000 
Size 0.421 0.257 -0.013 -0.052 0.825 -0.060 0.967 -0.014 -0.179 -0.013 -0.028 0.116 -0.099 0.125 0.006 1.000 
Tangibility 0.056 0.086 -0.017 -0.327 0.162 0.287 0.064 -0.041 0.031 0.019 0.027 -0.071 0.073 0.095 -0.025 0.086 1.000 
Volatility -0.369 -0.449 0.208 0.288 -0.236 -0.014 -0.258 0.155 0.194 -0.046 -0.142 0.096 0.290 -0.438 0.089 -0.261 -0.214 
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Table 4: Company Age and Failure Hazard 
The table investigates the relation between firm age and failure hazard.  Variable definitions are in Table 13 at 
the end of the paper.  We estimate the Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) discrete-time proportional hazard models 
incorporating a gamma mixture distribution to summarize unobserved firm heterogeneity (Meyer, 1990).  
Regression 1 estimates a hazard model similar to “Model 7” of Bharath and Shumway (2008).  In regressions 2, 
we only control for firm age.  In regressions 3 to 6, we include all control variables and add alternative 
definitions of firm age to inquire into alternative functional forms of the relation between firm age and failure 
hazard, namely: ln(Age) in regression 2; the age measure proposed by Pastor and Veronesi (2003), 1/(1+ Age), 
in regression 3; Age and Age2 in  regression 4 (for reading convenience, we multiply the coefficient of the 
quadratic term with 100); and the old-firm dummy (bOld) in regression 5.  Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance with 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90 confidence, 
respectively.   
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6
ln(Age) –0.713*** –0.275*** 
(0.044) (0.046) 
–1/(1+Age)  –4.588*** 
 (0.891) 
Age  –0.022*** 
 (0.005) 
Age2/100  0.015*** 
 (0.005) 
bOld  –0.239*** 
 (0.066) 
Naïve PD 1.534***  1.556*** 1.554*** 1.560*** 1.578*** 
(0.098)  (0.112) (0.111) (0.112) (0.113) 
s ln(E) –0.961***  –1.065*** –1.043*** –1.065*** –1.075*** 
(0.056)  (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) 
s ln(D) 0.100**  0.203*** 0.181*** 0.202*** 0.188*** 
(0.043)  (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) 
s 1/Volatility –0.256***  –0.263*** –0.283*** –0.259*** –0.275*** 
(0.044)  (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) 
s Excess return –0.157***  –0.214*** –0.214*** –0.214*** –0.212*** 
(0.027)  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
s Profitability –0.529***  –0.502*** –0.501*** –0.502*** –0.515*** 
(0.023)  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
Constant –5.037*** –1.638*** –4.378*** –5.467*** –4.799*** –5.156*** 
 (0.051) (0.132) (0.159) (0.075) (0.103) (0.069) 
Observations 69,920 57,898 57,898 59,229 57,909 57,909 
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Table 5: Company Age and Takeover Hazard 
The table investigates the relation between firm age and takeover hazard.  Variable definitions are in Table 13 at 
the end of the paper.  We estimate the Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) discrete-time proportional hazard models 
incorporating a gamma mixture distribution to summarize unobserved firm heterogeneity (Meyer, 1990).  
Regression 1 estimates a hazard model without firm age.  In regressions 2, we only control for firm age.  In 
regressions 3 to 6, we include all control variables and add alternative definitions of firm age to inquire into 
alternative functional forms of the relation between firm age and failure hazard, namely: ln(Age) in regression 2; 
the age measure proposed by Pastor and Veronesi (2003), 1/(1+ Age), in regression 3; Age and Age2 in  
regression 4 (for reading convenience, we multiply the coefficient of the quadratic term with 100); and the old-
firm dummy (bOld) in regression 5.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance with 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90 confidence, respectively.   
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6
ln(Age)  –0.172*** –0.129***    
 (0.028) (0.032)    
–1/(1+Age)    –2.434***   
   (0.671)   
Age     –0.006**  
    (0.003)  
Age2/100     0.002  
    (0.003)  
bOld      –0.117*** 
     (0.042) 
s Sales growth –0.116***  –0.116*** –0.114*** –0.116*** –0.111*** 
(0.020)  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
s MTB-equity –0.139***  –0.148*** –0.147*** –0.148*** –0.146*** 
(0.021)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
s Cash –0.052**  –0.066*** –0.066*** –0.066*** –0.062*** 
(0.021)  (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
s Debt ratio 0.010  0.005 0.010 0.004 0.007 
(0.021)  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
s Profitability 0.083***  0.091*** 0.094*** 0.089*** 0.087*** 
(0.021)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
s Excess return 0.098***  0.089*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 
(0.017)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
s Tangibility –0.025  –0.019 –0.024 –0.019 –0.019 
 (0.020)  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
s Size 0.000  0.017 0.010 0.020 0.007 
 (0.020)  (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) 
s Focus 0.124***  0.116*** 0.120*** 0.114*** 0.121*** 
 (0.021)  (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) 
Industry concentration –0.298**  –0.446*** –0.462*** –0.438*** –0.472*** 
 (0.126)  (0.150) (0.147) (0.149) (0.149) 
bActive industry 0.244***  0.295*** 0.301*** 0.292*** 0.311*** 
 (0.037)  (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) 
GDP growth 7.935***  7.203*** 7.248*** 7.250*** 7.205*** 
 (0.975)  (1.146) (1.128) (1.145) (1.136) 
Constant –3.461*** –2.667*** –3.126*** –3.657*** –3.378*** –3.492*** 
 (0.056) (0.092) (0.121) (0.065) (0.081) (0.062) 
Number of observations 77,971 65,658 65,658 67,055 65,658 65,658 
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Table 6: Company Age and Competing Exit Risks 
The table estimates pooled multinomial logit regressions with standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and firm clustering.  We distinguish between takeover and failure hazard as well as other exit reasons (not 
reported). Regression 1 only controls for firm age (ln(Age)).  In regressions 2 to 4, we add the control variables 
and estimate various functional forms of the relation between age and exit hazard.  ln(Age) in regression 2; Age 
and Age2 in  regression 3 (for reading convenience, we multiply the coefficient of the quadratic term with 100); 
and the old-firm dummy (bOld) in regression 4.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Variable 
definitions are in Table 13.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance with 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90 
confidence, respectively. 
 
 M-Logit 1 M-Logit 2 M-Logit 3 M-Logit 4 
 Takeover Failure Takeover Failure Takeover Failure Takeover Failure 
ln(Age) –0.193*** –0.736*** –0.134*** –0.239***     
(0.031) (0.043) (0.035) (0.051)     
Age     –0.008** –0.021***   
     (0.003) (0.005)   
Age2/100     0.004 0.015***   
     (0.003) (0.005)   
bOld       –0.114** –0.193***
       (0.049) (0.071) 
Naïve PD   –0.288** 2.216*** –0.284** 2.216*** –0.275* 2.240***
   (0.142) (0.138) (0.142) (0.138) (0.141) (0.137) 
s Size   –0.014 –0.647*** –0.013 –0.650*** –0.022 –0.663***
   (0.028) (0.053) (0.028) (0.053) (0.028) (0.053) 
s Debt ratio   0.070** 0.097** 0.069** 0.098** 0.070** 0.093** 
   (0.028) (0.039) (0.028) (0.039) (0.028) (0.039) 
s 1/Volatility   –0.014 –0.395*** –0.013 –0.393*** –0.021 –0.400***
   (0.031) (0.065) (0.031) (0.065) (0.031) (0.064) 
s Excess return   0.097*** –0.276*** 0.097*** –0.276*** 0.097*** –0.276***
   (0.021) (0.039) (0.021) (0.039) (0.021) (0.039) 
s Profitability   0.049* –0.566*** 0.047* –0.566*** 0.047* –0.572***
   (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) 
s Sales growth   –0.116*** –0.053* –0.115*** –0.054* –0.110*** –0.043 
   (0.026) (0.032) (0.026) (0.032) (0.026) (0.032) 
s MTB-equity   –0.113*** 0.054* –0.113*** 0.054* –0.111*** 0.058* 
   (0.026) (0.031) (0.026) (0.031) (0.026) (0.031) 
s Cash   –0.082*** –0.258*** –0.081*** –0.259*** –0.079*** –0.252***
   (0.028) (0.048) (0.028) (0.048) (0.028) (0.048) 
s Tangibility   –0.014 –0.036 –0.014 –0.036 –0.014 –0.033 
   (0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.033) 
s Focus   0.112*** 0.044 0.111*** 0.042 0.117*** 0.051 
   (0.027) (0.039) (0.027) (0.039) (0.027) (0.039) 
Industry conc.   –0.380** –0.269 –0.375** –0.261 –0.405** –0.300 
   (0.161) (0.239) (0.161) (0.238) (0.161) (0.239) 
bActive industry   0.317*** 0.174** 0.315*** 0.172** 0.333*** 0.195***
   (0.047) (0.070) (0.047) (0.070) (0.047) (0.070) 
GDP growth   4.763*** –5.660*** 4.798*** –5.651*** 4.755*** –5.408***
   (1.373) (1.879) (1.373) (1.880) (1.361) (1.858) 
Constant –2.540*** –1.473*** –2.980*** –4.355*** –3.229*** –4.697*** –3.366*** –5.045***
 (0.101) (0.124) (0.135) (0.194) (0.093) (0.134) (0.072) (0.104) 
Observations 55'503  55'503  55'503  55'503  
Pseudo R2 0.080  0.187  0.188  0.187  
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Table 7: The Economic Impact of Company Age on Exit Hazard 
The table shows predicted failure and takeover hazards from Model 2 of Table 6. All variables except for 
ln(Age) are kept at their average value.  The first line of the table shows predicted failure and takeover hazard at 
incorporation age 5 (ln(Age) = 1.6094). The second line of the table shows predicted failure and takeover hazard 
at incorporation age 25 (ln(Age) = 3.2189). 
 
 Failure hazard Takeover hazard 
Age = 5 Prediction: 2.66% (Standard error: 0.17%) 
4.77% 
(0.28%) 
Age = 20 1.99% (0.06%) 
3.85% 
(0.08%) 
   
Difference 1.99–2.66 = –0.67% 3.95–4.67 = –0.92% 
Standard error of difference 0.18% 0.29% 
Left-hand side interval limit –0.67 – 2*0.18= –1.03% –0.92 – 2*0.29= –1.50% 
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Table 8: Company Age and Formal Takeover Defenses 
The table investigates the relation between firm age and corporate antitakeover provisions.  Panel A examines 
the popularity of each provision (Sample mean) and investigates its relation with firm age.  Each row reports the 
result of two separate regressions of the governance on firm age (ln(Age) and b Old, respectively) and the set of 
control variables of Model 1 in Table 5.  For reading convenience, we report only the coefficients of firm age.  
We estimate conditional logit regressions with industry-year fixed effects and robust standard errors.  The 
governance variables except for institutional ownership are provided by IRRC on a bi- or triannual basis, 
starting in 1990.  To increase sample size, we interpolate those variables for missing sample years.  Data on 
institutional ownership is from CDA Spectrum. Panel B lists the frequency of changes in governance provisions 
and investigates whether these changes are related with firm age, conditional on the control variables.  The 
dependent variables in those regressions are binary variables that measure whether a given provision was added 
or removed in a given year, respectively.  Firms that have a specific provision in place are excluded in the 
column labeled Adoptions; those that do not have it are excluded in the column labeled Removals.  The control 
variables are again obtained from Model 1 in Table 5.  Variable definitions are in Table 13.  Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance with 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90 
confidence, respectively. 
      
Panel A: Company age and takeover defenses  
 
 Sample mean ln(Age) bOld 
b Dual class 0.097 0.137** (0.069) 0.322*** (0.091) 
b Staggered board 0.565 –0.062 (0.038) –0.065 (0.051) 
b Pill 0.917 –0.325*** (0.074) –0.224** (0.101) 
b Staggered board & b Pill 0.537 –0.101*** (0.037) –0.138*** (0.050) 
b Voting restriction 0.354 –0.153*** (0.039) –0.245*** (0.055) 
b Golden parachute 0.572 0.238*** (0.038) 0.193*** (0.052) 
b Institutional blockholder 0.361 0.082*** (0.018) –0.016 (0.023) 
 
Panel B: Frequency of changes in antitakeover protection  
 
Provisions Adoptions Removals Firm years 
 Observations Coefficient 
bOld 
Observations Coefficient 
bOld 
 
Dual class  21 – 44 – 12,060 
Staggered board 72 0.036 111 0.767** 12,060 
Pill 57 –0.833** 32 0.336 12,060 
Staggered board & Pill 87 –0.051 113 1.047*** 12,060 
Voting restriction 396 0.096 248 –0.577*** 12,039 
Golden parachute 674 –0.220** 424 –0.131 12,023 
Institutional blockholder 4,361 –0.150*** 2,673 –0.203*** 79,116 
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Table 9: Company Age Effect on Takeover Hazard and Antitakeover Provisions 
The table investigates whether the age effect we observe in Table 6 is related to the presence of antitakeover 
defenses.  We replicate the pooled multinomial logit regressions with standard errors corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and firm clustering of Model 2 in that table.  The arguments include the antitakeover defenses 
examined in Table 8.  Because almost all firms have a (shadow) pill, we include this provision only in 
combination with staggered boards. For reading convenience, we report only the coefficients of firm age and 
those of the individual defense provisions.  Variable definitions are in Table 13.  Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance with 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90 confidence, 
respectively. 
 
 Takeover hazard 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
bOld –0.533*** –0.532*** –0.526*** –0.138*** –0.554*** –0.516*** –1.055** 
 (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) (0.050) (0.128) (0.128) (0.485) 
b Dual class –0.084     0.015 –0.073 
 (0.199)     (0.200) (0.303) 
      × bOld       0.264 
       (0.430) 
b Staggered board & b Pill  0.118    0.039 0.247 
  (0.120)    (0.124) (0.184) 
      × bOld       –0.389 
       (0.267) 
b Voting restriction   0.106   0.056 0.065 
   (0.123)   (0.125) (0.185) 
      × bOld       0.106 
       (0.271) 
b Institutional block.    0.763***  0.522*** –0.212 
    (0.048)  (0.139) (0.282) 
      × bOld       0.585 
       (0.437) 
b Golden parachute     0.542*** 0.511*** 0.559*** 
     (0.126) (0.127) (0.194) 
      × bOld       0.091 
       (0.289) 
        
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 9'614 9'614 9'614 53'126 9'577 9'577 7'009 
Pseudo R2 0.544 0.544 0.544 0.196 0.547 0.551 0.571 
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 Table 10: Alternative interpretation of the age effect on takeover hazard 
The table investigates alternative interpretations of the effect of company age on takeover hazar.  Each row in 
the table reports coefficient estimates for the standard competing risk model of Table 6 (Model 4) when adding 
the variable listed in the first column to the control variables.  Moreover, we add interaction terms of bOld with 
that variable as well as with the control variables.  For reading convenience, we show only the coefficient of 
firm age, the coefficient of the variable in question, and the coefficient of the interaction term with bOld.  Panel 
A focuses on potential imbalances between growth and available resources.  Panel B asks whether the takeover 
market frees resources trapped in outdated structures. Finally, Panel C investigates the relevance of management 
age for exit risk.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Variable definitions are in Table 13 at the end of the paper.  
The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance with 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90 confidence, respectively. 
 
 bOld Variable Interaction Controls and interactions 
     
Panel A: Growth-resource imbalance     
bGrowth-resource imbalance –0.173** –0.134 0.106 Included 
 (0.067) (0.147) (0.100)  
     
Panel B: Trapped resources 
bHigh R&D & bLow growth –0.101** 0.157 –0.402 Included 
 (0.049) (0.543) (0.361)  
bHigh capex & bLow growth –0.101** 0.361 –0.286 Included 
 (0.051) (0.279) (0.178)  
     
Panel C: Old management team 
bOld board –0.545** –1.185** 0.361 Included 
 (0.220) (0.580) (0.327)  
bOld CEO –0.435** –0.672 –0.034 Included 
 (0.159) (0.456) (0.240)  
  
 page 39 
 
Table 11: Firm Age and Exit Risk in Distressed Industries 
The table asks how industry distress affects exit risk at old age. As in Opler and Titman (1994) and Gopalan and 
Xie (2011), among others, an industry is assumed to be in distress if median sales growth is negative and median 
stock return is below –30%.  Distressed industries are identified with the binary variable bIndustry distress.  
Regression 1 adds bIndustry distress as well as an interaction term with the old–firm dummy to the standard 
competing risk regression model from Table 6.  Regression 2 also includes interaction terms for all other control 
variables (not shown).  Regression 3 estimates the standard competing risk regression in the subsample of firms 
that operate in distressed industries.  To preserve space, we do not report the coefficients of the control 
variables.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance with 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90 confidence, 
respectively. 
 
Full sample Distressed industries 
 M–Logit 1 M–Logit 2 M–Logit 3 
Takeover Failure Takeover Failure Takeover Failure 
bOld –0.098** –0.258*** –0.095* –0.269*** –0.891*** 0.589** 
(0.049) (0.074) (0.049) (0.074) (0.335) (0.272) 
bIndustry distress –0.047 0.264 –0.798** –0.997** 
(0.175) (0.185) (0.399) (0.468) 
bOld × bIndustry distress –0.671** 0.689*** –0.797** 0.858*** 
(0.315) (0.265) (0.338) (0.283) 
Other controls Included Included Included 
Other cont. × bInd. distress Excluded Included Excluded 
Observations 55,503 55,503 1,827 
Pseudo R2 0.186 0.188 0.201 
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Table 12: The Source of the Company Age Effect on Takeover Hazard 
The table investigates the source of the company age effect on takeover hazards.  Panel A shows the prevalence 
of firms with BWM characteristics in our sample.  Panel B controls for firms with BWM characteristics in the 
relation between firm age and takeover risk. We estimate the standard competing risk model of Table 6 (Model 
4) when adding the interaction term bLow growth & bStable to the control variables.  Moreover, we add 
interaction terms of bOld with bLow growth & bStable as well as with the control variables. We focus on 
takeover.  For reading convenience, we show only the coefficient of firm age, the coefficient of the variable in 
question, and the coefficient of the interaction term with bOld.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Variable 
definitions are in Table 13 at the end of the paper.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
with 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90 confidence, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Prevalence of firms with BWM characteristics 
 
 Proportion of firm years with  bLow growth & bStable = 1 
  
Full sample 0.231 
  
Sub-sample of old firms (bOld = 1) 0.306 
Sub-sample of young firms (bOld = 0) 0.148 
  
 
 
Panel B: Controlling for BWM in the relation between age and takeover hazard 
 
Variable added to the specification of Model 4 
in Table 6 bOld Variable Interaction 
Controls and 
interactions 
     
No variable added –0.114**    
 (0.081)    
bLow growth & bStable  0.013 0.035 –0.555*** Included 
 (0.053) (0.192) (0.141)  
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Table 13:  Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition  
Panel A: Firm age 
Age Age is computed as one plus the difference between the year under investigation and the firm’s 
year of incorporation;   
bOld a dummy variable that identifies firms older than the median in any given year;  
  
Panel B: Control variables 
bActive industry Binary variable equal to 1 if at least on acquisition occurred in a firm’s 4–digit SIC industry 
during the previous year. Otherwise, the variable is set equal to 0; 
Cash The firm’s cash and short–term investments (che) divided by the book value of its total assets (at – 
ceq + csho×prcc_f – txdb); 
D The firm’s book value of debt (dltt + dlc); 
Debt ratio Ratio of the book value of debt (D) to the market value of the firm’s assets; 
E The firm’s market value of common equity (csho×prcc_f); 
Excess return The firm’s market–adjusted stock return.  The market is the CRSP value–weighted  NYSE/AMEX 
index; 
Focus The Herfindahl index, HE, captures the degree of specialization based on the sales in the firm’s 
different segments, as reported on the COMPUSTAT Segment tapes:  
i
N 2
E i 1
H p , 
where N is the number of segments, the subscript i identifies the segments, and pi is the fraction of 
the firm’s total sales in the segment in question.  Focus is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm’s 
Herfindahl index is 1, otherwise it equals 0; 
GDP growth The relative change in the U.S. gross domestic product.  The data are from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce; 
Industry concentration We follow Giroud and Mueller (2010), among many others, and measure the lack of competition 
of the firm’s industry (3–digit SIC) with a Herfindahl index, HE: 
, 
where N is the number of  firms in the same 3–digit SIC industry, the subscript i identifies the 
firms, and si is the firms’ market share based on sales (sale). The higher the index, the less 
competitive the industry becomes. To correct for potential misclassification, we drop the top 2.5% 
of the firm–years at the right tail of the distribution (Giroud and Mueller, 2010);   
MTB–Equity The firm’s market value of equity (E) divided by its book value of equity (ceq).  We use this ratio 
as a proxy for Tobin’s Q; 
Naïve PD The “naïve” default probability implied by Merton’s (1974) model (see Bharath and Shumway, 
2008); 
Profitability Net income (ni) divided by book value total assets (ta); 
Sales growth The ratio of the firm’s current sales (sale) divided by the sales of the previous year minus 1. Sales 
figures are expressed in 2009 dollars;  
Size The log of the market value of the firm’s assets (at – ceq + csho×prcc_f – txdb); 
Tangibility The firm’s property, plant, and equipment (ppent) divided by Size. 
Volatility The annualized standard deviation of the firm’s monthly stock return. We calculate volatility over 
a 5–year window. The data are from the monthly CRSP tapes; 
  
Panel C: Antitakeover protection 
bDual class  Binary variable that identifies firms with multiple classes of stock outstanding; 
bGolden parachute Binary variable that identifies firms with golden parachutes; 
bInstitutional 
blockholder 
Binary variable that identifies firms with an institutional blockholder than owns more than 5 
percent of the firm’s outstanding shares.  The data are from CDA Spectrum. 
bPill Binary variable that identifies firms that have a poison pill or a blank check preferred stock 
authorization; 
bStaggered board Binary variable that identifies firms with classified boards; 
bVoting restrictions Binary variable that identifies firms with restrictions on shareholders to vote by written consent or 
to call a special meeting 
  
Panel D: Other variables 
bGrowth–resource 
imbalance 
Binary variable that identifies firms with either one of the following two characteristics: a) 
bLowgrowth = 1 and Cash larger than the industry average; or b) bLowgrowth = 0 and Cash 
N 2
E ii 1
H s 
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smaller than the industry average. 
bHigh R&D Binary variable that identifies firms with R&D expenses (xrd) larger than the industry average.  
We standardize R&D expenses by sales. 
bHigh capex Binary variable that identifies firms with capital expenditures (capx) larger than the industry 
average.  We standardize capital expenditures expenses by sales. 
bIndustry distress Binary variable that identifies industries with negative median sales growth and median stock 
return below -30 percent; 
bLowgrowth Binary variable that identifies firms with growth opportunities smaller than the industry average in 
any given year. Growth opportunities are defined as the firm’s share price (prcc_f) minus the 
present value of the equity in place, expressed in % of the share price.  To obtain the value of the 
equity in place, we follow Richardson (2006) and compute it as (1–1.24×0.12) 
×ceq+1.24×1.12×oiadp–1.24×0.12×dvc;   
bOldCEO a dummy variable that identifies firms with CEO age higher than the industry average in any given 
year; 
bOldboard a dummy variable that identifies firms with average director age higher than the industry average 
in any given year; 
bProfitable Binary variable that identifies firms with Profitability > 0. 
bStable Binary variable that identifies firms with Asset volatility below the industry average in any given 
year. Asset volatility is the weighted average of equity volatility and debt volatility.  Debt 
volatility is assumed be 5% + 0.25*Volatility.  The weights are the ratio of book equity and book 
debt in the firm’s capital structure (defined as sum of book value of debt and equity).  See Barath 
and Shumway (2008); 
 
 
 
 
